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ABSTRACT 
 
William Johannes Wesselhoeft: A Malleable Strategic Culture?  
Transatlantic Think Tanks as Autopoetic Systems 
(Under the direction of Holger Moroff) 
  
This essay pioneers a systems theory/liberalist approach to strategic culture. Employing a 
3rd generation definition of strategic culture which treats security decisions as culturally unique 
and scientifically traceable, it works with the theory of Niklas Luhmann and Andrew Moravcsik. 
Societal interest groups operate within a society/environment milieu in their creation of strategic 
culture. The milieu is self-referential, ‘autopoeitic.’  
Think tanks, ‘Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik’ (SWP) and ‘Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Auswärtige Politik’ (DGAP), have their Transatlantic leanings evaluated as autopoeitic milieus, 
for societal actor interest and structural coupling. SWP and DGAP have very different levels of 
autonomy in their research agenda/productive output, and likely different influence in German 
foreign policy towards the Transatlantic relationship. Evident is a ‘thought bubble’ (autopoeisis) 
and high level of structural coupling with non-government donors in DGAP, compared to SWP, 
with high research/production output autonomy – no thought bubble – and a low level of 
potential structural coupling with private corporations. SWP can be considered a quangos (quasi 
non-governmental organization), while DGAP cannot be. Think tanks evaluated exhibit societal 
actor behavior, operationally closed or open to evolutionary developments. This indicates that 
think tanks, and other systems involved in foreign policy creation, are malleable. Strategic 
culture is malleable. 
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CHAPTER 1: THEORY 
Introduction 
With the Trump election in the US, the Brexit vote in the UK, the refugee crisis in 
Europe, and Germany being looked to as a leader in the European Union, it is crucial that the 
United States maintains an understanding of the creation of the foreign policy of its closest 
allies as the world potentially goes up in flames. The discontent of populist groups across 
human civilization marks an attitudinal change towards the legitimacy of government and the 
feasibility of continued globalization. Economic insecurity is accompanied by physical 
insecurity as exemplified by terrorism. The trusted leaders of yesterday are today the political 
opponents – the culmination of exploitation of negligence of national interests – of the self-
ascribedly underserved middle class across Europe, the US and parts of Asia. Democracy has 
come into question, as has the efficacy of the government in handling crisis, from basic 
economic needs to an influx of disputedly deserving immigrants.  
The interests of the US in the Middle East have turned into a need for Europe to look 
outside of the EU’s borders and establish a voice where the US has not been able to solve 
foreign policy conflicts on its own. The days of Germany’s abstaining vote in the UN on US 
engagement in Iraq are past, and Germany is environmentally being pressured into exercising 
a strategic culture which is true to its values and also consistent with its interests. Germany’s 
critical strategic alliance with the United States during these hard times serve as reason for 
examining the German-US Transatlantic relationship. 
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In order to better understand the strategic relationship between Germany and the US 
author chooses to forge a theoretical framework for the understanding of strategic culture 
through systems theory and international relations theory. The case study implements the 
strategic culture theory into the Transatlantic relations programs of two leading German 
foreign policy think tanks. The case study elucidates their approaches to facilitating a 
strategic relationship with the US, utilizing the researched and employed strategic culture 
theory.  
Strategic Culture 
 
The added value of strategic culture as attributing culture-unique circumstances to 
security decision outcomes is fairly clear. According to the work of Alastair Ian Johnston, 
strategic culture is, “an ideational milieu which limits behavioral choices... [and] from these 
limits one ought to be able to derive specific predictions about strategic choice” (Johnston 
1995:46). The importance of viewing strategic culture as institutionally derived -- by 
collectives, military establishments, policy communities, societies and the like -- argues to 
the reader that the bottom-up origin of top-level decisions is explanatory. Thus, there is 
potential to manipulate the decision milieu in order to trigger certain results. There is at once 
an assumption of 3rd generation strategic culture theory that cultures are unique in their 
security decisions, and that each strategic culture makes decisions which are scientifically 
traceable (Johnston 1995). Deconstructing a security decision can take various forms, as 
evidenced by the vast range of strategic culture scholarship available to the reader.  
Within strategic culture theory there has been rather heated discourse (see Colin 
Gray’s cutting response to Alastair Ian Johnston; Gray 1999) about which of three 
generations of strategic culture thought is correct and useable. Johnston (1995) differentiated 
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ideational strategic culture and operational behavior. He recommended an academic shift 
towards implementing strategic culture analysis which was less determined by ideational and 
professed values, and rather placed importance on just considering ideational and professed 
values, and comparing them to operational behavior. He cited the observation by cultural 
scholars that there was a difference between what political leaders were saying and what they 
were doing. This, in Johnston’s mind, was ground for finding a more dependent/independent 
variable approach to strategic culture analysis. He noted that there is likely continuity 
between strategic cultures across states (in the West), and that this ‘thought bubble’ might be 
causing a dominant strategic culture discourse to take place. Thus, there is potentially no 
unique strategic culture, making the field of strategic culture ready for scientific analysis. 
The cultural context that strategic decisions occur within are purportedly constrained by the 
status quo Realpolitik of international relations, within the Western ‘bubble’ of strategic 
discourse.  
Colin Gray sharply criticized Johnston’s scientific reconceiving of strategic culture. 
He argued that Johnston’s ‘new way’ did not give adequate credence to Gray’s first 
generation scholarly notion that culture is equal to context. Gray reinforced the first 
generation’s view -- of which he is a leading member -- that strategic culture study is a way 
to understand the context of security decisions. However, he concluded with the concession 
that the first generation’s thought could be amended to focus more on the idea/behavior 
discord, which was the origin of, and reason for, Johnston’s reconceived strategic culture 
methodology.  
A broad and brief background of strategic culture thought is found in Thomas 
Mahnken’s report on United States Strategic Culture, for the Defense Threat Reduction 
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Agency of the US government (Mahnken 2006). Mahnken begins with the Ancient Greek 
awareness that militaries had different capabilities depending on the formulation of their 
state. Much later, German “Continental” strategic thought had been differentiated from 
British “Maritime” strategic thought, by the early 20th century (Corbett 1911 in Mahnken 
2006:3).  Finally, he references Colin Gray’s (1999) description of strategic culture as the 
following: “a nation’s strategic culture flows from its geography and resources, history and 
experience, and society and political structure” (Mahnken 1999:4). This is referential to the 
definition’s broadness. The category of strategic culture is multi-faceted and diverse, with 
several areas ripe for evaluation; resting on the basic assumption that culture serves as a 
milieu within which strategic decisions are made. 
The author’s strategic culture research has found the definition of strategic culture to 
be a broadly applicable subject, which can be focused towards a contextual definition for 
case study. Examples of such definitions have been made available in studies of strategic 
culture in Germany. For the reason of strategic culture’s broadness of definition, it is 
important for the author to define strategic culture for the purpose of this essay. Hoffman & 
Longhurst (1999) set out a three-point description of strategic culture, which will be 
summarized here in recognition of its ostensible objectivity and intelligibility, as well as 
dynamism in being applicable as a foundational definition upon which a focused, contextual 
definition may be derived. The definition is based on the work of seminal strategic culture 
scholars including Ian Johnston, Macmillan, Jacobsen, and Katzenstein (Hoffman & 
Longhurst 1999:47). 
First, strategic culture approaches negate assumed universal rationality by 
emphasizing security choices as historically derived. This means that the historical context 
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for strategic decisions is variable and dependent on the culture’s presumed assumptions about 
the security environment, as well as the environmental pressures which the culture responds 
to strategically. Second, “strategic culture is about collectives and their shared attitudes and 
beliefs” (Hoffman & Longhurst 1999:31), whether that be military establishments, policy 
communities or entire societies. This aspect of security culture’s description is greatly 
important to this thesis’ approach, because this thesis will evaluate security culture as derived 
from ‘differentiated societies,’ as understood later in this essay’s theoretical framework. 
Third and finally, strategic culture is the limiting and determinant environment -- the 
‘milieu’-- in which decisions about security are made: “information is received, mediated and 
processed into appropriate responses” (Hoffman & Longhurst 1999:31). This is the clearest 
brief definition of security culture, as the milieu which constrains decisions. However broad, 
it is a solid foundation to build a focused definition on. 
Establishing a focused definition of strategic culture for this essay must begin with a 
discussion of culture in the context of political relations and influence groups, because this 
field looks at the cultural interface that a society has with politically related security 
decisions. Johnston’s definition of culture was tailored for strategic culture work; within a 
society, “dominant subcultures can impose cultural forms on other groups, manipulate them, 
or convince other subcultures that these dominant cultural forms are in fact their own forms” 
(Johnston 1995:44). 
This shows striking relation to Andrew Moravcsik’s liberalist assumption that societal 
preferences are expressed by influence-seeking actors; the most competitive actors succeed 
(Moravcsik 1998:517). This relates to dominant subcultures imposing cultural forms on other 
groups, for example via policies, as in the argument of Hoffman & Longhurst (1999), above. 
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“Games like coordination, assurance, prisoner’s dilemma, and suasion have distinctive 
dynamics, as well as impose precise costs, benefits, and risks on the parties” (Moravcsik 
1998:521). Adding another layer of theoretical understanding, Niklas Luhmann’s non-
hierarchical ‘differentiated societies,’ as compositional of society, would show discordance 
from the idea of a ‘dominant subculture.’ The relation to Luhmann’s thought, however, 
would be that a dominant subculture which imposes cultural forms on other subcultures is 
parallel to formal communication between societies, which causes societal evolution, 
described as ‘autopoeisis.’ This will be further delved into later. 
Returning to the definition of strategic culture, Johnston has prefaced it as a, “milieu 
which limits behavioral choices” (Johnston 1995:45). Strategic culture’s ‘central paradigm’ 
has two facets within a society’s culture; first, as a ‘system of symbols’ (ibid:46). The 
‘system of symbols’ is composed of 1) how the strategic environment is perceived, for 
example whether war is inevitable or an ‘aberration,’ 2) how the adversary is perceived and 
the threat it poses – zero-sum or variable-sum --, and 3) the ‘efficacy of the use of force,’ 
which is how well the society perceives its ability to engage with strategic threats and solve 
their related problems. This ‘system of symbols,’ form Johnston’s ‘central paradigm’ of 
strategic culture (ibid:46). The second facet of strategic culture is at the operational level, 
which affects strategic behavior. This facet of strategic culture is not relevant to this thesis, 
and therefore only the 1st facet, focusing on the ‘central paradigm,’ is chosen for the 
theoretical framework of this essay. Answers to the central paradigm questions will lead to a 
strategic culture that, for example, favors offensive choices versus diplomatic choices. 
Building on the definitions of Hoffman and Longhurst (1999) and Johnston (1995), the 
 7 
definition of strategic culture employed by this essay is, the milieu created by societal actor 
groups which determines strategic decisions, and will be expanded upon. 
This thesis approaches strategic culture from a theoretical framework which 
incorporates liberalist international relations assumptions alongside a theory of modern 
society. The theory of modern society by Niklas Luhmann can be compared with Andrew 
Moravcsik’s liberalist assumptions to differentiate preferential choices versus more 
determined evolutionary changes. This is in an attempt to be able to predict strategic choices, 
and possibly manipulate strategic culture to trigger specific outcomes. Following is work on 
Luhmann’s thought, to be later engaged with Moravcsik’s work and strategic culture, in 
order to complete the theory foundation requisite for employing a case study thereupon. 
‘Luhmann’s Theory of Modern Society’ 
Society is differentiated into various non-hierarchal subsystems, which might be 
pictured as ‘a stack of overlapping staggered pancakes.’ There is not necessarily a center of 
society as has been the status quo assumption in previous systems theory. Luhmann rather 
suggests that differentiated subsystems of society take on tasks which they are orientated 
towards handling, in reaction to external pressures. As the greater society receives pressure 
from the environment, the adequate differentiated – for example economic or political -- 
society rises to the occasion and both handles the pressure and evolves as necessary and with 
an amount of randomness due to unforeseen communications to and from other differentiated 
societies. There is a ripple effect, where other differentiated societies will evolve due to the 
process of formal communication; communication from one society to another registers and 
triggers evolution in the differentiated society. Thus, Luhmann proposes that society is self-
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creating and also self-limiting. This evolutionary process which societies go through -- 
within the greater society -- is called ‘autopoeisis.’ 
Autopoeisis necessarily fosters a new society to environment relationship, and thus 
there are new possibilities, for example, for policy to be exercised in the face of existing and 
new threats. This is accompanied by the fact that, “no system can operate outside of its 
boundaries” (Luhmann 1992:70), which is termed operative closure (ibid). This is the 
realization and acceptance that however pioneering and ‘out-of-the-box’ a phenomenon may 
seem; it is still happening within the autopoeitic constraints of the system. ‘Structural 
coupling’ occurs between two differentiated societies, such as politics and economics, where 
there is an overlap of operational interest -- for example -- when creating a federal economic 
policy. 
An observation of the entirety of society would make evident that society is 
continually evolving via formal communication, which reciprocally evolves -- ‘autopoeisis’ -
- adding to its differentiated society constitution. Fundamental in understanding Luhmann’s 
theory of modern society is that there is no hierarchy of differentiated societies, and that the 
differentiated societies are all interacting with each other, within the greater society. In terms 
of the environs, the greater society’s space is differentiated from its environment by the lack 
of formal communication -- for example, where there is a lack of policy action in the 
environment, and presence of policy action (an example of formal communication), in the 
societal space. Thus, all the space that is filled by formal communications by differentiated 
societies is what constitutes the entire society. That which is not formal communication by 
the differentiated society is not society. The differentiated societies within the greater society 
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pay credence to Luhmann’s titling of ‘the society of society;’ in the native German, Die 
Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997). 
Luhmann’s theory of modern society emphasizes that differentiated societies 
compose the greater society. They communicate and trigger evolutions to themselves and 
thus to the greater society. The differentiated societies play a similar role in the greater 
society as the societal actors who influence the wider state decisions in liberalist thought. 
While liberalist thought -- as identified by Moravcsik -- does not focus on the environment-
society differentiation, its focus on the interests of societal actors to be expressed in state 
preferences can be seen parallel to Luhmann’s evolutionary reactions of the appropriate 
differentiated societies to external evolutionary triggers – pressures from outside of the 
society.  
Emphasizing the ‘Thought Bubble’ According to Johnston and Luhmann 
This essay has taken into account the definitions and descriptions of various scholars 
who are intertwined in their work in the strategic culture academic environs. The character of 
the strategic culture definitional discourse shows relation to a concept emphasized in 
Luhmann’s theory of modern society. In relatively developed societies, a society will observe 
the greater society, for example where an academic department evaluates a political office’s 
behavior in the state. In a relatively less developed society there will be little or no 
observation from a society towards the greater society or another society, evidenced by a lack 
of critical thought and action, especially in the administrative societies of society. Repetitive, 
uncritical behavior is, according to Johnston, evidenced in a continuity of strategic culture 
thought in the West. This served as the premise for his ‘scientification’ of strategic culture 
evaluation. It is worth noting the following example of Mahnken, Gray and Searle in their 
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writings on the strategic culture world, for their possible un-criticalness and repetitive 
thought, or ‘thought-bubble’ behavior.  
Thomas Mahnken – in his report on U.S. Strategic Culture -- was writing for the US 
government and rested the foundation of his work on Gray’s definition. Gray is a British 
academician from Oxford University, and interestingly founded the U.S. defense-focused 
National Institute for Public Policy in Washington D.C., which receives major funding for 
the U.S. government and perceives post-Soviet threat – in line with strategic culture’s initial 
purpose of analysis in evaluating the Soviet versus U.S. exercise of nuclear-oriented military 
culture to predict strategic behavior. The cold war purpose of the Gray’s strategic culture fits 
contextually within the U.S. defense institution’s objectives for security. 
Relatedly, Alaric Searle, another British-originated academic elite – educated at 
Edinburgh University and Free University Berlin—who works on British and German 
politico-military issues, cited Mahnken’s thought. To reiterate, Mahnken supported Gray. 
Indeed, the academic universe of strategic culture necessitates a coordination of supported 
citations in order to establish organized thought, and that has seemingly been the nature of 
political-academic link in Washington D.C. The observation that these three scholars; 
Mahnken, Gray and Searle, as scholars whose work influences and is influenced by the US-
UK political-academic overlap, is significant in reference to continuity of thought across 
academic society, in Luhmann’s understanding of societies within society. The dominant 
political-academic discourse in the US is arguably, and at least popularly, monopolistic upon 
realist assumptions. This elucidation could be evidence for Ian Johnston’s conception of 
strategic culture as being constrained within its own cultural environment. The point of this is 
to bring to the fore the disputable nature of strategic culture in the context of possible 
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political-academic overlap as was evident with Gray, Mahnken and Searle, who are arguably 
part of the Western thought bubble marked by continuity in the strategic culture discourse. 
Gray’s 1999 cutting response to Ian Johnston evidenced the status quo of strategic thought in 
the Western thought bubble by displaying the entrenched interests of Gray, who is 
evidentially a political-academic entity involved in Washington D.C. 
The system as constraining within itself, as a ‘thought bubble’ which is exemplified 
by political-academic overlap which is potentially evidential of entrenched interest, is further 
developed by applying Niklas Luhmann’s theory of modern society, where the most 
developed societies enter into the developmental level where they become self-observant -- 
society observing society (Luhmann 1992:73). An example would be a political science 
department, which has a distinguishable ecosystem and population, examining a subject such 
as German foreign policy creation, another field with a distinguishable topic and ecosystem 
of formal policies and actors; formal communication and autopoeisis which is causative of 
evolutionary change. The ‘thought bubble’ idea is also a strong exemplification of 
Luhmann’s thought, because it necessitates an understanding of multiple ecosystems within a 
larger ecosystem; which is a crucial basis for the formal communication that leads to 
evolutionary autopoeisis. Autopoeisis leads to new possibilities with an adjusted society-
environment relationship, and this is the case with strategic culture discourse in the Anglo-
American academic sphere, but there is also potential evidence of operational closure as the 
discourse becomes self-satisfying, and the possibilities for new thought are closed off into 
this ‘thought bubble.’ 
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Moravcsik’s Societal Preferences as Explaining Autopoeitic Behavior 
Understanding the evolutionary change, via autopoeisis, that occurs as the societies of 
society aggrandize in the face of environmental pressures, provides an organismic, natural 
picture that the process of constituting policies entails. To focus on the specific societies 
within society which play host to policy creation in the face of external-pressure triggered 
autopoeisis, we can explain the harnessing of Moravcsik’s societal actors as constitutive of 
self-interested influence towards state action. Primarily, Moravcsik approaches societal actor 
influence from his first liberalist assumption of international relations; ‘societal primacy.’ 
“Societal ideas, interests and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state 
preferences” (Moravcsik 1998:513). While Moravcsik describes domestic politics as where, 
“the state is not an actor but a representative institution constantly subject to capture and 
recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors” (Moravcsik 
1998:518), this thesis aims to extend the capture and recapture by social actors into the 
greater society as conceived by Luhmann. Social actors, who in this essay are termed 
‘societal’ actors, perform autopoeisis within the greater society. This autopoeisis can be 
exemplified by foreign policies propagated by a government. Moravcsik’s liberalism would, 
in this extension, understand foreign policies as determined by societal actor capture and 
recapture due to preferential interests. 
To provide a brief synopsis of Moravcsik’s liberalist surmising as a preface to our 
case study; the ‘three core assumptions’ of liberalist thought on international relations are; 1) 
“the fundamental actors in world politics are individuals and privately-constituted groups 
with autonomous preferences, 2) governments represent some subset of domestic social 
actors; and 3) the interstate behavior is shaped primarily by the pattern of state preferences, 
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not state power” (Moravcsik 1992:2). Moravcsik later distilled his three core assumptions as: 
a. the Primacy of Societal Actors, b. Representation and State Preferences, and c. 
Interdependence and the International System (Moravcsik 1998:517-518). This essay focuses 
on the Primacy of Societal Actors (1), in relation to Luhmann’s differentiated societies, 
which autopoeitically evolve new policies in reaction to the environment. 
In the Primacy of Societal Actors, where individuals are rational and conservative, 
and influenced by scarcity towards conflict or cooperation (Moravcsik 1998:517). “Socially 
differentiated individuals define their material and ideational interests independently of 
politics and then advance those interests through political exchange and collective action…in 
pursuit of material and ideal welfare” (Moravcsik 1998:517). There is a striking relation here 
to Luhmann’s differentiated societies where they are phrased by Moravcsik as ‘societally 
differentiated individuals.’ Here, I iterate the relation into an understanding which sees 
differentiated societies and societally differentiated individuals as of the same ilk. Just that 
they are driven by different attitudes; that is, Luhmann explains their development as a result 
of autopoeisis and Moravcsik as a result of self-interest influence. In fact, Moravcsik’s 
differentiated individual/societal actor is based on Luhmann’s understanding of role theory, 
with individuals playing different roles such as student, parent, plaintiff, consumer, etc. 
Entire sub-systems of society, the ‘societies of society,’ create their own rules and behave 
accordingly, within those created constraints. These ‘sub-systems’ are self-referential – their 
behavior occurs in reference to their own rules, and the behavioral phenomenon that occurs 
within this ruleset is termed ‘autopoeitic;’ self-generating. Moravcsik’s societal actors are 
self-referential and are the origin of autopoeitic behavior.  
 14 
An example of liberalist theory’s understanding would be the treatment of the 
following as a symptom of preferences. “Increased spending initiated by a new ruling elite 
ideologically committed to territorial aggrandizement is a preference-induced change in 
strategy consistent with liberalism” (Moravcsik 1998:521). Thus, the focus is on the 
preference for specific strategy, which is strikingly consistent with strategic culture theory as 
a milieu for strategic preference results. The preferences are a result of ‘structural coupling,’ 
where sub-systems in Luhmann’s mind, or societal actors in Moravcsik’s mind, influence 
each other only indirectly. This is because all operations which are relevant to a sub-system, 
for example in politics, take place within that subsystem. Thus, to have a multi-actor/multi-
sub-system policy preference, there must be structural coupling at the subsystem level 
(among the societies of society), for example between business-interested actors and socially-
interested actors in a parliament, who formally hold negotiations to agree upon a policy. 
Moravcsik’s core assumptions of liberalist international relations thought see the 
‘primacy of society’ as fundamental to state action. Thus, there is not necessarily an 
institutional hierarchy which leads to state action, but rather that societal actors are able to 
exert their influence at different levels to force state action which is in their interest. This is 
similar to Luhmann’s diffuse center of society, and lack of a hierarchy in creating decisions 
which are evolutionarily determined within specific differentiated societies. However, 
Moravcsik does iterate liberalist thought’s evaluation tools at the purviews of society, state, 
and international dependency. Thus, it ostensibly may be conflictual with Luhmann’s theory 
of modern society in that Moravcsik may be a purport that there is a hierarchy of societies 
which does not exist in Luhmann’s greater society. However, the identification of societal 
actors as influencing state behavior serves as a strong link to Luhmann’s differentiated 
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societies, because we can look at how differentiated societies might behave as societal actors. 
Just as societal actors attempt to ‘capture and recapture’ the state’s operations with their 
interests, there may evidently be structural coupling between sub-systems/societal actors 
which leads to the cooperation that makes this possible. This provides a sophisticated 
theoretical framework – drawing from international relations and from sociology -- to 
evaluate the societal group/differentiated society interests and their necessary evolutionary 
operations, which exhibit either 1) preferences – in accordance with Moravcsik’s liberalism, 
or 2) evolutionary -- autopoeitic – responses, within the greater framework of differentiated 
societies; in accordance with Luhmann’s theory of modern society.  
Preferences versus Evolutionary Decisions (Autopoeisis) 
The difference between preferences and evolutionary decisions is qualitative, in that 
preferences are adjustable and imply a sense of subjectivity and self-satisfaction – an 
operative closure to the environment (Luhmann 1992:70), where evolutionary decisions 
imply a sense of determination which is nonadjustable to the nature of the milieu surrounding 
the decision – and they create a new relationship between the society and environment; new 
possibilities are now potential. Preferences are selfish actions, where evolutionary decisions 
are indisputable necessities. The purpose of this differentiation is to identify which forces 
behind a foreign policy decision are forcefully constrained by the environment, and which 
forces are subjectively evolving within their own milieu and thus potentially variable – less 
an objective force of evolution and more a subjective force of motivation. In all, identifying 
which strategic culture aspects may be manipulated in order to trigger a certain outcome, 
versus which strategic culture aspects are comparatively set and unchangeable, is the purpose 
 16 
of this process of evaluation. As explained later, the funding which creates an autopoeitic 
thought bubble can be deemed as a structural coupling. 
Operational Definition of Strategic Culture 
The operational definition of strategic culture is the milieu created by societal actor 
groups which helps limit strategic decisions. It will be methodologically interpreted for 
application to a case study. The definition is supported by and engaged with the work of 
Johnston, Luhmann and Moravcsik. It integrates central parts of each scholars’ relatable 
work on the subject of this essay, into a feasible definition which serves as a paradigm for 
understanding strategic culture in a societally-derived way. Strategic culture will be 
understood through an evaluation of a foreign policy milieu case study, because foreign 
policy is an exemplification of state strategic behavior. A foreign policy milieu case study, 
then, as an exemplification of state strategic behavior, can be evaluated to look for evidence 
of being caused by societal interest groups, and for autopoeisis. This two-level method of 
analysis will shine light on the origin of the strategic culture of a selected case study. The 
author can conclude on the proportion to which the case study’s strategic culture can be 
understood in terms of the operational methodology, which consists of analysis for: 1) 
preferential choices (net attitudinal leanings) which exist in autopoeitic milieus (thought 
bubbles [in think tanks]), which might be 2) structurally coupled to funders.  
Contemporary Work on German Strategic Culture 
Significant publications on the topic have included: the evolution of multilateral and 
bilateral relationships (Haftendorn 1999) in the reaffirmation of a ‘strategic triangle’ between 
Germany, France and the US. The reviewing of Germany’s behavior in military engagements 
around the world, and participation in EU battlegroups, with reference to a European Union 
 17 
strategic culture (Chappell 2010, 2014). A description of Germany’s strategic culture by its 
preferences in EU common defense policy (Keohane 2016). Then, Becker, for the French 
Ministry of Defense, analyzed recent changes in the dispatching pattern of the Bundeswehr 
(German Army) (Becker 2013). Longhurst considered Germany’s post-War history from a 
constructivist view, and then looked to changes in the deployment of the Bundeswehr in 
recent conflicts, as well as national conscription policy (Longhurst 2004). Brummer looked at 
the role that ‘agency’ played in determining Germany’s strategic culture, examining 
Germany’s role in the Kosovo war as a case study (Brummer 2012). Dalgaard-Nielsen 
explains German strategic culture’s identity and transformation by examining Bundestag 
debates and Bundestag votes (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2005). Hoffman & Longhurst looked at the 
German military’s role, “in past incarnations of Germany” (Hoffman & Longhurst 1999:32), 
evaluating broad historical policy and political events, beginning after World War 2. Malici 
looked at ideational values, tracing their evidence in foreign policy decisions (Malici 2006). 
Clearly, there has been significant contribution to understanding German strategic culture 
from a variety of perspectives. However, it is the purpose of the author to question to what 
extent certain foreign policy think tanks have a role in the forming of state policy towards the 
Transatlantic relationship. 
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CHAPTER 2: CASE STUDY 
 
Introduction 
Where contemporary German strategic culture has been explained through several 
means which does not include looking at the think tank community, this essay seeks to 
evaluate the topic specifically by looking at a certain think tank community, as an autopoeitic 
sub-system, which structurally couples with other subsystems, to cooperate towards a policy 
attitude towards transatlantic relations. The think tank community thus behaves like a 
societal actor, which attempts to capture and recapture state power to satisfy its own interests.  
The topic here is the leading think tank discourse on Transatlantic relations. For the 
US, it is crucial to have an understanding of the foreign policy creation of its closest allies, in 
order to predict and work with current and future avenues of conflict and cooperation. The 
theoretical framework presented provides the thesis with an approach that is justified upon a 
theory of modern society as well as a theory of societal actor influence in state behavior. The 
concept of strategic culture is discussed and defined for this thesis, and the supporting 
parallels are drawn out to the thought of Luhmann and Moravcsik. The question of how 
foreign policy is created due to societal actor influence is now poised on the basis of that 
theoretical framework, as well as the question of whether there is evident autopoeisis 
occurring. Societal actor influence can be identified from surmising the leading policy 
discourse leanings on Transatlantic relations from leading German foreign policy think tanks. 
Autopoeisis may be evidenced in the form of policies which are seemingly derived from one 
another, as well as policies which are related and dependent on one another. Transatlantic 
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relations discourse leading foreign policy think tanks in Germany will serve as the case study 
for our theoretical framework.  
The author concedes that the hard evidence for theoretical autopoeisis will be difficult 
to ascertain in a case study. Thus, the conclusions gleaned from policy discourse, interpreted 
as institutional (think tank) preference due to societal interest groups will be used as a 
context upon which extrapolations regarding the evidence of autopoeisis will be formed. To 
begin with, the author proposes a methodology for functional application in understanding 
the theoretical framework’s added value towards the case study. That is, case study evidence 
– publications on Transatlantic relations by leading German foreign policy think tanks – will 
be evaluated for the foreign policy positions they take towards the Transatlantic relations 
discourse. Specifically, the author will look at Transatlantic relations related production 
output and programs, from which there is an implication of the attitudinal approach taken by 
the German foreign policy think tank community. The evidence of autopoeisis will be more 
evident in the latter – that is, the attitudinal recommendations for the academic community.  
Think tanks occupy the space between government and academia, “serve as a bridge 
to build and uphold civil society” (Anheier 2008:30). As McGann put it, Think Tanks, “often 
act as a bridge between the academic and policymaking communities and between states and 
civil society, serving in the public interest as independent voices that translate applied and 
basic research into a language that is understandable, reliable, and accessible for 
policymakers and the public” (McGann 2016:6). Civil society, policy actors or policy makers 
consider or adopt think tank research and programs (ibid:20). The definition of civil society 
is dynamic, in that civil society may be apart from think tanks, for example academics as 
civil society which listen to think tanks as the bridge from civil society to government. Think 
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tanks, as bridges from civil society to government, are also integrated into civil society and 
government to varying extents, where they are funded by governments, as is often in the 
German case, or are employers of academics who also operate within the more strictly 
academic world, for example as professors. For example, McGann describes think tanks as a 
bridge between civil society and the state, but also as “civil society actors in the policy-
making process” (McGann 2016:Abstract). Given that leading foreign policy think tanks in 
Germany are involved in the contract research for the German state, according to (DNI 
2008), and that experts have been involved in foreign relation exercise, for example German-
Syrian intelligence services cooperation talks (ibid), it is fair to assume a significant degree 
of influence from the foreign policy think tank community in German state foreign relations. 
Of course, how much influence, is in question. 
Evaluating Think Tanks as Autopoeitic Systems & Structural Coupling to Funding 
 Where other approaches to German strategic culture have been taken, this paper takes 
the approach built on the work of Luhmann and Moravcsik. Autopoeitic systems traditionally 
take the form of “politics”, or “economics” (etc.), but the aim of this paper is to attach the 
idea of autopoeitism to societal actorship, where cooperation towards policy happens at the 
level of ‘structural coupling.’ Societal actors as autopoeitic systems can be exemplified by 
think tanks, which exert policy influence and are structurally coupled to various other 
autopoeitic systems, by variables including funding (finance), and employment. Structural 
coupling leads to cooperative operations, including, for example, the attitude a think tank 
community has towards a policy relationship. Evaluation of origin/amount of funding and 
type/constitution of employment, then, will yield a better understanding of how structurally 
coupled select think tanks are to other autopoeitic systems.   
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According to the 2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, Germany has 194 
think tanks. Of these think tanks, there are two (2) which are chosen to be evaluated for this 
essay. The think tanks are as follows: German Institute for International and Security Affairs 
(SWP) and German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Because this thesis is using the 
field of foreign affairs to exercise the theoretical framework outlined in the theory section of 
this paper, the think tanks chosen are especially influential in foreign policy discourse. The 
two think tanks were selected by the utilization of three sources. First, the University of 
Pennsylvania’s 2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index (McGann 2016), which ranks German 
think tanks among regional think tanks of Western Europe. Second, from the 2016 Foreign 
Policy Research Institute FPRI Western Europe database, of which the author gratefully has 
access to; funding and employment levels are listed are were consulted in further selecting 
the think tanks. Finally, and crucially, the 2008 US Directorate of National Intelligence 
(DNI) publication entitled “German Think Tank Guide” (DNI 2008) provides a synopsis 
section of major German foreign policy think tanks which justifies the DNI’s 2008 
interpretation of them as the most crucial foreign policy think tanks in Germany. Reference 
to the other sources confirms their position as most important foreign policy think tanks in 
accordance with 2016 data.  
Given appropriate evaluation of Transatlantic relations projects and production output 
in leading German foreign policy think tanks, the author will understand the attitudinal 
orientation – that is – in terms of this thesis – an example of the strategic culture of the 
German foreign policy community towards Transatlantic relations. Then, the variables of 
employment and finance can be looked at and compared to the attitudinal orientation, thus 
throwing light on the amount of structural coupling that there might be between these think 
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tanks and other autopoeitic systems/societal actors. The larger question is whether these think 
tanks, as independent policy institutes, do actually provide independent advice, or whether 
this is more a case of “who pays the piper, calls the tune.” Comparing the evidence gleaned 
from the first part of the analysis on programs and production output, to the sources of 
funding, will help answer this question. 
Transatlantic Relations Projects at SWP and DGAP 
 The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) discourse on 
Transatlantic relations is first evaluated through its ‘Transatlantic Relations’ projects. There 
are three projects made public on the subject, which are TAPIR – the Transatlantic Post-Doc 
Fellowship for International Relations and Security, the Daimler EU-US Program (Daimler 
U.S. Forum on Global Issues), and Security and Defence in Northern Europe (SNE). TAPIR 
is a post-doc program which places fellows in leading think tanks in Switzerland, the UK, 
Finland, Germany, France, Norway, Poland and the US. Notable is that all of these countries 
consist of either the closest US allies – UK, Germany and France, Norway or are 
bordering/part of the Former Soviet Union (Finland, Poland). Agreements with think tanks in 
other countries do not exist in this program.  
The Daimler U.S. Forum on Global Issues is biannual and hosted by three leading 
think tanks in the U.S., UK, and Germany. They are: the Brookings Institution (Washington), 
the Centre for European Reform (London) and the German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP, Berlin). As a “regular, confidential dialogue between decision-
makers and think tanks in the United States and European Union on current issues of 
international politics” (SWP 2017), a Washington-London-Berlin association is displayed. It 
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is notable that other important transatlanticly-interested countries, including France, are not 
part of this confidential Transatlantic dialogue. 
Security and Defence in Northern Europe (SNE) is funded by the Norwegian Ministry 
of Defence and is a cooperative research program between three think tanks in Norway, the 
US and Germany. They are: The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (US, CSIS), and SWP (Germany). Germany is seen as a 
regional key actor in the region (Northern Europe), and the US is seen as a key actor outside 
of the region (SWP 2017).  
The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) has the ‘USA/Transatlantic 
Relations Program,’ which has the following three areas of focus: 1) Afghanistan Operation, 
2) Establishing Contact between transatlantic partners and the “Arab Spring” freedom 
movement, and 3) US election campaigns. The concern of DGAP on Transatlantic relations 
is stated by, “Political decisions in Washington often have direct effects on Germany. The 
transatlantic relationship is the central context for German and European foreign policy” 
(DGAP 2017).  The goal of this program is to, “strengthen strategic dialogues between Berlin 
and Washington” (ibid), as well as foster an, “exchange of ideas among political elites in 
order to anchor an equal partnership instead of a merely politically expedient alliance” (ibid). 
Beyond the focus on elite dialogue on strategic thought, DGAP stands out as a 
learning institution. There are in-person discussion groups in USA/Transatlantic Relations 
include ‘study groups’ on: ‘Strategic Issues’ which cover developments in NATO and 
“Germany and Europe’s role in strategically relevant areas” (ibid). ‘European Policy’ has an 
emphasis on the EU’s common foreign policy. ‘Global Issues’ focuses on maintaining a 
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secure energy supply. ‘Transatlantic Relations for professionals under 35’ encourage 
networking for younger foreign policy actors.  
In addition to DGAP’s ‘study groups,’ which exemplify part of the think tank’s role 
as civil academic institution where teaching happens, there are two final ‘Activities and 
Initiatives’ of the US/Transatlantic Relations Program are “Friends in Crisis” – Lessons in 
Crisis Management from Afghanistan, and ‘Research Project: The German Debate on 
Afghanistan’. Emphasis here on Afghanistan and inevitably the security role that US and 
perhaps correspondingly Germany, plays in the regional security of Afghanistan.  
The stated purpose of the USA/Transatlantic Relations Program at DGAP including 
the, “anchoring of an equal partnership” (ibid) between the US and Germany indicates 
interest in augmenting the current strategic relationship. Focus on Afghanistan points to 
DGAP’s interest in being a part – either physically or within the strategic discourse -- of the 
US engagement in Afghanistan. DGAP’s focus on in-person projects to strengthen the 
Berlin-Washington strategic dialogue offers a broader, U.S relationship-focused approach, 
compared to SWP’s differentiated academic, political and regional security project approach 
which includes the UK and Norway within its Transatlantic relationship projects.  
The Transatlantic relations projects at SWP display strong interest in cultivating 
security relationships that include the US. The US is part of the academic, political dialogue 
and regional security projects, which demonstrates strong links across all three fields. 
However, the lack of U.S. funding could demonstrate a lack of interest in involving 
American money – this might be further investigated. The UK is included to a lesser extent, 
in the academic and political dialogue projects, and not in the regional security project for 
Northern Europe. UK-based BP Europa is the only non-German corporate funder of SWP. 
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Norway has funding links to SWP via the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and the Nordic 
Council of Ministers. Norway also funds the SNE regional security program. Norway has 
significant links to DGAP.  
Notable is the United States presence in DGAP funding. The only two countries of 
origin for funding for DGAP are Germany and the United States. DGAP has comparatively 
far fewer sponsors, as well no diversity in national source of funding. SWP is comparatively 
more differentiated in its projects, which receive funding from more diverse sources, 
including private corporations. However, SWP does not receive US funding, where DGAP 
does receive US funding. 
Content Output on Transatlantic Relations at DGAP and SWP 
SWP and DGAP put out content on the Transatlantic relationship, of which a brief 
synopsis may be made and perhaps an attitudinal orientation inferred. The author intends to 
utilize this portion of the case study to bolster the evidence towards the possible surmisal of 
an attitudinal characterization and orientation of SWP and DGAP towards the Transatlantic 
relationship. Given that a surmisal rests on incomplete evidence, the author proceeds 
knowing that politics is volatile and so may be the intellectual thought that is corollary it. The 
author choses to look at the most recent production output on transatlantic relations which 
can be found in the online publication databases of each of the think tanks’ websites. 
Authors and Topics  
To evaluate whether there is autopoeisis present in DGAP and SWP publications, we 
can look at which authors have the most published content on transatlantic relations. The idea 
is that if there are a handful of authors (employees) who publish the majority of the 
publications, there may be grounds for further investigation into a think tank on the basis that 
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there might be a lack of scholarly diversity; and that a ‘thought bubble’ has formed. As 
independent policy institutes, think tanks can be seen as an institutional attempt to approach 
the public good from an unbiased standpoint, as Jim McGann as iterated. Additionally, the 
political leaning of the chief authors’ content output on Transatlantic relations may indicate 
the personal stake that they, as academicians, have, and could point to autopoeisis within the 
think tanks, which will be more relevant when we look at overall think tank funding for 
evidence of structural coupling between the think tanks and their funding sources.  
The author used the DGAP and SWP websites for research on transatlantic 
publications and employment. DGAP allows a ‘topic search’ for ‘Transatlantic Relations;’ 
there are 9 articles that have identified authors (2 without, 11 total). SWP allows one to 
access ‘Publications,’ and then ‘Refine Search,’ by ‘Issues’ for ‘Transatlantic Relations.’ 
SWP has 42 articles on Transatlantic Relations. There are 3 SWP authors with more than 3 
publications, which constitute 14/42 or 33% of total Transatlantic Relations publications (all 
publications have identified authors). There are 2 DGAP authors with more than 3 
publications, which constitute 7/9 or 78% of Transatlantic publications with identified 
authors. 
 At DGAP, the 2 most prolific authors, who make up 78% (7/9) of publications are 
Josef Braml and Daniela Schwarzer. 3 out of 4 of Braml’s authorship take an economic 
approach, (“Diplomacy by Other Means” [the USA’s use of trade agreements as soft power], 
“Transatlantic Relations in Dire Financial Straits” [the USA needs to shift responsibility to 
others in delivering free trade and stable currency], “President Obama’s Berlin Visit” [the 
President’s will to enhance economic ties is thwarted by Congress, which has shifted US 
economic focus to Asia; Germany can step in as a regional economic and security actor]. 
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Braml’s 4th publication is, “The Bush Administration’s Faith-Based Foreign Policy” 
[Europeans are distancing themselves from US leadership, with good reason]. 
 Schwarzer focuses on the decaying state of the USA-Germany relationship, as with: 
“New Deals for the Old Continent” [The new US presidency (2017) is focused solely on its 
own interests and Europe can no longer rely on the US], “Obama’s Message to a Sober 
Germany” [“Germany’s view of Washington is Today Sobered”], “Why Obama Couldn’t 
Rescue US-German Relations”, [there is a fundamental value differential between the US 
and Germany].  
 Braml, focuses on the US’ declining ability to project economic power across the 
Atlantic, and therefore Germany’s opportunity to ‘pick up the reigns’ and step up as an 
economic/financial institution and political actor. Schwarzer focuses on the deep differences 
between the USA and Germany in international political outlook and characterizes Germany 
as currently breaking away from US leadership in international relations. Both authors focus 
on Germany stepping into a new role which is independent from the US. DGAP’s authorship 
is not diverse and is on the great majority inhabited by Braml. The critical view serves to 
portray DGAP’s production output as a platform for diplomatic protest against the status quo. 
This is quite different from SWP, as well shall soon see. 
 SWP’s 3 most prolific authors on Transatlantic Relations constitute 33% (14/42) of 
total publications on the subject and are the following people: Annegret Bendiek, Markus 
Kaim and Stormy-Annika Mildner. Bendiek has 6 publications, where the other 2 authors 
have 4 publications each. 5 of 6 of Bendiek’s publications are on cybersecurity, where she 
tends to propose cooperation to formulate better cybersecurity policy between the US, NATO 
and EU. She does note in 1 article the political effect of the NSA/Snowden affair, where 
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Germans were likely discontented with US cyber policy (“Europe Must Balance the Digital 
Hegemon”). As opposed to breaking from the US relationship, she proposes assertive 
cooperation by Germany with the US. 
 Kaim (4 articles) focuses on the new security role strategy of Germany, especially in 
reference to its place in NATO and NATO reform (“Reforming NATO’s Partnerships”, “The 
New White Paper 2016 - Promoting Greater Understanding of Security Policy?”), to 
improves NATO’s effectiveness, as well as in the EU, as an important EU security strategy 
contributor (“New European Security Strategy – The The Transatlantic Factor”, “Partnership 
Plus: On the Future of the NATO-Ukraine Relationship”). Kaim’s work is largely in 
reference to international institutions and sees the US as a piece of the security environment 
rather than inhabiting its entirety.  
 Mildner writes on trade relations and focuses on cooperation and how it can be 
enacted between Germany and the US (“Shoulder-to-Shoulder for Open Markets and 
Investor Protection”), within the greater frameworks of the WTO, EU and TEC 
(Transatlantic Economic Council), to accomplish common goals such as the former TTIP 
(“Trade Agreement with Side Effects?, “Conflict Management in Transatlantic Trade 
Relations”). She notes the deadlock that occurs in international negotiations and applauds 
Germany for its ability to push through an EU-interested agenda amongst such a deadlock in 
the 2007/8 portion of the Doha Round (“Between Transatlantic Integration and the Doha 
Round”). 
 The SWP publications seem to be less a platform for diplomatic protest, and rather 
write in reference to the greater international institutions (the EU, TEC, TWO, NATO, etc.), 
looking for avenues and strategies of cooperation  (whether they discuss security, 
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cybersecurity, or trade policy). DGAP publications highlight the deteriorating (or 
fundamentally divided) relationship between the USA and Germany, and the USA and the 
EU, as well as the new-found prospects for Germany’s influence in trade/economics/financial 
standards and international institutional politics/security to increase. SWP’s approach as a 
relatively diverse think tank, with 3 authors who have online publications on the topic, is 
comparably more diverse when set next to DGAP (3 SWP authors have written 33% of 
output, where 2 DGAP authors have written 78% of output).  
Having established a synopsis of DGAP’s and SWP’s majority Transatlantic relations 
publications, the author now moves to understand whether the phrase, “Who pays the piper 
calls the tune,” applies to SWP and DGAP. 
 Overall Funding of DGAP and SWP 
DGAP Transatlantic Relations publications are about the decline of the USA and the 
decline of the US-German relationship. SWP publications, on the other hand, favor 
cooperation with the US and other international institutions. What does the source of funding 
tell us about the interests of the funders. In other words, if SWP is funded by corporation X, 
is corporation X then interested in supporting free-trade initiatives such as the former TTIP? 
And if DGAP is funded by government Y, then is the ruling party of government Y 
interested in enhancing German prestige on the world stage/influence in international 
relations? Understanding that the variables of certain funders would have to be identified as 
being, for example, ‘interested in German prestige,’ ‘interested in free-market’, etc., would 
be a difficult task, the author restrains from making certain assumptions that the following 
funders (corporations, governments etc.) can have their interests so easily ascertained. Thus, 
the following is an identification of the chief funders of each think tank, DGAP and SWP, 
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and extrapolatory discussion which is by no means the end-all, be-all of where mentioned 
corporate or government interests lie. The following discussion is meant to stimulate the 
wider discussion on whether, “who pays the Piper, calls the tune” is an issue worthy of more 
scientific investigation. Structural coupling could be evident where there is 
Funding for DGAP is in the majority sourced from the following organizations, 
which have contributed €100,000 or more in the past year (2016): Airbus Group, German 
Foreign Office, Robert Bosch Foundation, Deutsche Bank, Dr. Arend Oetker and Otto Wolff 
Foundation. Of the €4.5Million budget1, approximately €2Million was derived for 
specifically requested projects (“Erträge aus Projektmitteln”), while about just €840,000 was 
awarded from the German government ‘without any strings attached’ (“Bundeszuschüsse 
außerhalb des Projektgeschäfts”). So, approximately 45% of all income was for project-
specific funding, and just 19% (€840,000/€4.5M) of income was ‘no-strings-attached’ 
government funding. €3.7M (81%) of the overall budget was from non-governmental 
sources. 
SWP Funding Institutions consist of three categories: German Funding Institutions, 
International Funding Institutions, and Sponsors. The only international funding institutions 
are: British Petroleum Europa SE, the Nordic Council of Ministers, and the Norwegian 
Ministry of Defense. The private corporation funders are BP Europa SE, Daimler, Deutsche 
Bank, and Volkswagen AG. Notable is that four of the five private corporation funders are 
German. The only international funders are Norwegian/Nordic government institutions and 
UK-based BP. 
                                                      
1 DGAP Jahresbericht 2015/16 
https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/static_page_downloads/dgap_jahresbericht_2015_2016.pdf 
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SWP’s total 2016 revenue amounted to about €14.83Million2. The €12.3M (83% of 
total revenue) provided by government grants cover the entirety of the think tank’s estimated 
personnel and operating costs and is equal to the total budget presented to the German 
government in requesting the think tank’s yearly grant. Thus, it is fully funded by the 
government. SWP “operates exclusively under public regulations” (SWP Funding 2016). 
Additionally, SWP officially determines its own research agenda and “does not accept any 
research commissions.” However, SWP is allowed to receive additional revenue up to 25% 
of the total government grant. In 2016, this amounted to €2.53Million, 56% of which was 
interestingly sourced from the German government and European Union. The additional 
funds are used for special research projects, and SWP does not receive commissions from 
further revenue attained from such special research projects. There is a firm commitment to 
“scientific rigour, independence and relevance” (ibid). 
DGAP is significantly more reliant on private project-specific funding (€2M versus 
€4.5Million total budget, or 45%), versus SWP (€2.53Million Additional funding/€14.83 
total budget, or 19%). Additionally, SWP iterated its ideals of scientific rigor and academic 
independence in forming its own agenda. This was not as clear with DGAP. The overall 
budget of SWP (€14.83M), is over 3 times the size of DGAP (€4.5Million). This is reflected 
in the number of online publications on Transatlantic relations (SWP:42, DGAP:11). 
 
 
 
                                                      
2 SWP Funding 2016 https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/about-swp/foundation/funding/ 
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CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
Discussion 
 
The case study was an evaluation of 3 aspects of Transatlantic Relations work at 
DGAP and SWP. 1) Projects with commentary on project-specific funding sources, 2) 
Authorship and Publications/Production Output and, 3) Overall funding sources. Following is 
the conclusion, which is an iteration of the findings from each section, and then a discussion 
of what this could mean in terms of the theoretical framework built in this thesis, which 
created a ‘searchlight’ for preferences and autopoeitic/self-referential systems. These might 
be evident in ‘thought bubbles’, where there is a lack in diversity of authorship, and a lack of 
diverse opinion in authorship, as well as in structural coupling of funding to authorship. 
SWP is motivated to foster “regular, confidential dialogue between decision-makers 
and think tanks in the United States and European Union on current issues of international 
politics” (SWP 2017). In practice, there is a tripartite of projects differentiated into academic 
post-doctoral placements, US-UK-Germany political biannual strategic dialogues, and 
regional security in Northern Europe funded by the Norwegian government. SWP covers a 
broad field with its three projects which take place in different spheres of foreign policy 
influence. There is significant (perhaps surprising) weight given to the German-Norwegian 
and German-Nordic relationship, especially in context of NATO country think tank 
exchanges in the post-doc program. Funding from the Nordic Council of Ministers and 
Norwegian Ministry of Defense pushes this point.  
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The US-German relationship is inclusive of the UK’s presence in the post-doc 
exchange program and the presence of a London segment of the Biannual strategic summit 
between the US, UK and Germany. Thus, the UK may act as a broker or at least a 
complement to the Transatlantic relationship from Germany to the US. This is in contrast to 
DGAP’s exclusive focus on the Germany-US transatlantic relationship, evidenced by the 
motivation to, “strengthen strategic dialogues between Berlin and Washington” (DGAP 
2017). The DGAP approach is broader foreign policy which focuses the relationship with the 
US as a strategic actor. Projects on Afghanistan and the Arab Spring indicate this. The SWP 
regional focus, and regional ally focus, is in contrast to this. Funding coming from the 
German Marshall Fund and US Embassy connect the source of funding as being only US and 
German to the fact that the think tank is focused on the US in its Transatlantic relationship.  
DGAP publications demonstrated a lack of diversity relative to SWP, with 78% on 
Transatlantic relations being authored by just two authors, and the majority of those by Josef 
Braml. The content of the DGAP publications stood in contrast to SWP publications, because 
DGAP publications emphasized Germany’s new role as a strategic actor and where it can 
‘take the reigns’ from the US in the international monetary system. The discontent that some 
Germans feel with US foreign policy is highlighted as well, as the effect of DGAP’s 
publications left the author with a view of DGAP publications as un-diverse in author and 
opinion, as well as negative towards the Transatlantic relationship. 
SWP publications, on the other hand, were relatively diverse in authorship and 
content (33% by 3 authors). The SWP publications tended to look for areas of cooperation 
with the US and thus framed the Transatlantic relationship mostly positively, as an avenue 
where economic and security benefits can be enhanced via TTIP and NATO updating. 
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Funding for SWP is entirely (100%) guaranteed by the German government, and 
SWP receives and additional 25% funding from external sources for special projects –- 56% 
of which still comes from government bodies: the German government and European Union. 
This is in contrast to DGAP, which is guaranteed just 19% by the German government. 45% 
of DGAP’s budget comes from project-specific funding, the funding sources of which, were 
not specific in the available data (Jahresbericht 2016). SWP’s total budget (€14.83M), is over 
3 times the size of DGAP’s (€4.5Million). This is reflected in the number of online 
publications on Transatlantic relations (SWP:42, DGAP:11). 
SWP is effectively a quangos (quasi non-governmental organization), which receives 
full funding from the German government but acts independently, because only €1.11M 
(7.5%) of the overall budget is derived from sources other than the German government and 
European Union. This €1.11M is 44% of total external funding (€2.53M), and the remaining 
56% (€1.41M) comes from the German government and European Union.  Where SWP is 
effectively a Quangos in respect to these budget-derived numbers, DGAP does not receive 
enough money from the Germany government, as a proportion of its budget, to be considered 
a quangos. DGAP only receives €840,000 (19% of a €4.5M total budget) from government 
sources (the German government). €2M (45% of total budget) comes from its non-
governmental sponsors for specific projects, within a total of 81% (€3.7M) deriving from 
non-governmental sources towards the overall budget. 
It seems that there is a ‘thought bubble’ in DGAP, where Braml and Schwarzer write 
nearly all Transatlantic relations publications. When funding is considered, there could be 
structural coupling between DGAP’s production output and projects -- which are at once 
dedicated to community learning and focused on elite dialogue -- and DGAP’s sources of 
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funding. While DGAP is committed to strengthening the Washington – Berlin dialogue, the 
lack of ‘no strings attached’ government funding makes the author question whether the non-
governmental funding behind DGAP is causing DGAP to reduce its potential output on 
Transatlantic relations which would be outside of a Berlin – Washington focus, due to a 
possible emphasis on the corporate lobbying interest which German companies necessarily 
have in Washington. Although DGAP has quite clear autopoeitic authorship/production 
output, this is not as clear with corporate funded projects. It would be a presumption to state 
that the corporate lobbying is the basis for Washington – Berlin dialogue to be the focus. 
However, the author asserts that this would be a worthy avenue of further investigation. 
Structural coupling between DGAP’s projects and production would then be proved. At the 
least, there is a far greater chance of DGAP’s projects and production to be structurally 
coupled to the interests of its non-government donors, because they are just that – non-
German governmental, and thus the independent research/production initiative that think 
tanks thrive on may not be as respected as it is in SWP, with its full adherence to 
public/independent scientific research protocols. 
SWP shows autopoeisis mostly in its publications on cybersecurity, because one 
author has written all the articles on the topic, as well as the most articles of any author. This 
is more easily justifiable, though, because having a single expert on cybersecurity in 
Transatlantic relations is relatively, a very focused topic. Other than cybersecurity, there is no 
evidence of autopoeisis/self-referential systems in the authorship and production of SWP on 
Transatlantic relations. The funding, as a very important variable, comes almost entirely from 
the German government, which comes in respect to public/independent research legal 
clauses. This means that SWP likely maintains its research and production independence to a 
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far larger degree when compared with DGAP. Thus, for SWP, they who pay the piper 
probably do not call the tune. Structural coupling, then, is less likely between SWP and its 
funding sources. Where there is the potential for structural coupling, is where the 25% 
additional revenue that SWP pulls in, is dedicated to special research projects, as outlined 
above. However, SWP’s emphasizes following public/research independence protocols, and 
in establishing its own agenda; it can be considered a quangos. This is much less so for 
DGAP. 
Conclusion 
 The sophisticated theoretical framework set out an ambitious plan to understand 
strategic culture from the perspective of a ‘thought bubble’ which may or may not be 
operationally closed to further evolutions, which are in turn restricted by either preferences 
or an external sense of determination. Where Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory was bridled 
astride the thought of Andrew Moravcsik’s liberalist societal actors, this paper was able to 
point out the possibility for structural coupling between think tank interests, the authors 
employed, and the funding received. The explanatory target being ‘Strategic Culture,’ we 
were able to disentangle the origin of foreign policy attitudes as being differentiated in 
societal actorship. Indeed, who determines foreign policy is directly linked to foreign policy 
action. 
The strategic culture of DGAP and SWP towards the Transatlantic relationship 
differs. DGAP scholarship takes a negative approach, while SWP takes a positive approach. 
The strategic culture has been deconstructed in order to find it origins, using the evaluation 
tools of autopoeisis and structural coupling to understand the strategic culture as preference 
formation. DGAP’s thought bubble in authorship (78% of online Transatlantic publications 
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by 2 authors) is contrasted by SWP’s lack of one (33% of online Transatlantic publications 
by 3 authors). The scale difference between the two think tanks is reflected by the SWP’s 42 
available online transatlantic publications, versus DGAP’s 9 (11 including those without 
identified authors). The budgetary difference is large as well, with SWP functioning as an 
almost entirely governmentally funded quangos (total budget: €14.83M), and DGAP deriving 
most of its funding from other sources and not being a quangos (total budget: €4.5M).  
 Funding plays a vital role to the think tanks’ survival and funding derived externally, 
from non-governmental sources, may determine the agenda of DGAP, where it is either not 
so, or much less so, at SWP. 8% of project funding at SWP is non-governmentally derived, 
where 45% of project funding at DGAP is non-governmentally derived. Thus, external 
funding influence on strategic culture leaning would be more evident at DGAP than at SWP. 
SWP’s regional, cooperative focus stands in contrast to DGAP’s bilateral, Washington – 
Berlin focus, as understood by looking at their Transatlantic projects. The amount of 
influence that SWP and DGAP have in Germany’s foreign policy towards the Transatlantic 
relationship may be reflected in the amount of funding that each think tank receives from the 
government.  
 The case study prevailed in applying a pioneering approach to strategic culture 
creation. It indicated that strategic culture is readily determined by societal actors who have 
interests. This means that strategic culture is more malleable than would be expected from a 
conservative definition of culture. The evolutionary behavior of strategic culture actors is, 
according to our analysis, operationally open and operationally closed based on the societal 
actors involved. Hopefully, this serves as an analytical exposure of strategic culture creation, 
and as an argument for the malleability of strategic culture.  
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